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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Valentin Calvillo appeals from his convictions for sexual abuse of a child
and lewd conduct with a minor.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Calvillo was indicted for eight counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a
minor and two counts of sexual abuse of a child, for which he first went to trial in
2010. (#39529 R., pp. 11-15, 48-52, 56.) In the middle of trial Calvillo fled the
country; the trial carried on without him, and he was found guilty of seven counts
of lewd conduct and one count of sexual abuse. (#39529 R., pp. 208-14, 2471

50.)

Calvillo petitioned for post-conviction relief.

(R., p. 116.)

The state

stipulated that Calvillo’s original trial counsel was ineffective and his petition was
granted. (R., p. 116.) Calvillo’s convictions were vacated and the district court
ordered a new trial. (R., pp. 116, 171.)
Prior to the second trial, the state served a notice of intent to present
evidence of Calvillo’s flight from the original trial. (R., pp. 92-98.) This request
was denied by the district court, which noted Calvillo’s explanations for the flight
“may necessarily bring into evidence his prior verdict of guilty which would clearly
prejudice the defendant and which this court would not want to be before a new
jury.” (R., p. 122.) The district court denied the state’s motion, concluding that “if

Of the ten counts originally charged one count of sexual abuse was dismissed
on the defendant’s motion during the first trial. (#39529 R., pp. 208-09.)
1
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the circumstances of the defendant’s prior jury trial and the outcome of that trial
were before the new jury the prejudicial effect of the prior trial proceedings would
substantially outweigh the probative value of the flight evidence in the State’s
case in chief.” (R., p. 123.)
In 2016 a new trial was held on eight charges of lewd conduct and one
charge of sexual abuse. (R., p. 140.) Just before voir dire, the district court
issued the following jury instruction:
Likewise, none of the statements, opinions, or beliefs expressed by
any of you prospective jurors are evidence in this case, and you
should not permit any such statements, opinions, or beliefs to
influence your decision if you are selected to be a juror in this case.
(Tr. p. 35, Ls. 10-15.)
During voir dire, in response to the district court’s question whether any
potential juror had prior knowledge related to the case (Tr., p. 35, Ls. 19-25), the
court and a potential juror had the following exchange:
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Juror Number 65, … what is
your source of information of this case?
JUROR 65: I worked at the jail as a nurse while Mr. Calvillo was
incarcerated.
(Tr., p. 37, Ls. 3-7). This juror was immediately excused by the district court.
(Tr., p. 37, Ls. 8-9.) The court then had the following exchange with another
potential juror:
THE COURT: … Juror Number 70, … what is your source of
information of this case?
JUROR 70: I had a professional relationship with the defendant.
THE COURT: Okay. And how long ago might that have been?

2

JUROR 70: It was about 2008 until about the time he went missing.
THE COURT: Okay. And that was—so have you had any dealings
with the defendant since 2008?
JUROR 70: No, sir.
(Tr., p. 37, Ls. 10-20.) This prospective juror was likewise dismissed by the
court. (Tr., p. 37, L. 25 – p. 38, L. 7.) No other juror mentioned Calvillo’s
incarceration or the fact that he “went missing.” (See generally, Tr.)
Calvillo’s attorney moved for a mistrial based on the two statements,
arguing that the jurors “infected ... the entire panel with information related to
Mr. Calvillo’s incarceration” and “information that in someway, somehow, he went
missing.” (Tr., p. 152, L. 6 – p. 154, L. 14.) The district court denied the motion:
THE COURT: All right. Well, the Court does recognize that whether
or not to grant a mistrial is a matter of discretion for the trial court.
The Court is to exercise its discretion within its legal bounds
through an exercise of reason.
My recollection is that the jurors that were excused—I believe …
Juror 70, indicated that he had a professional relationship with
Mr. Calvillo, that that relationship was for approximately 2 years in
2008. [Juror 70] did say—and the word I heard was “when he was
missing.” The exact phrase—certainly, he did not couch that
statement in the context of this case, and the jurors were previously
instructed by this Court that the statements of any jurors during the
course of voir dire are not evidence for purposes of this
proceeding. My assumption is that those jurors, assuming they
recall that statement, will follow that instruction.
… Juror 48, indicated that she was familiar with the defendant from
her work in the jail, I believe, as a nurse. Certainly, there’s an
inference there that Mr. Calvillo was, perhaps, incarcerated at
some time. While I think it is an unfortunate statement, I do not
believe that it is a basis for a mistrial.
All of the jurors who remain have promised that they would decide
this case solely based upon the evidence presented here.
Certainly, the two offending jurors were previously excused, so
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there is no possible further contamination, and so the Court would
deny the request for mistrial at this time.
(Tr., p. 154, L. 20 – p. 155, L. 23.) Calvillo’s counsel appeared to preserve his
objection to the panel when he stated “[w]ith that, Judge, just for the record, I will
pass the panel for cause, withholding that objection.” (Tr., p. 156, Ls. 1-3; see
also p. 151, L. 25 – p. 152, L. 5.) Calvillo did not challenge any jurors for cause.
(Confidential Ex., pp. 5-8;2 see also, Tr., pp. 76-150.)
The victim testified against Calvillo. (Tr., pp. 326-423.) Of note, when the
victim was asked “how much longer was [Calvillo] living in the house” after the
abuse was reported, she testified that “I think two more days, because the next
day, my mom took me to a clinic and—or maybe it might have been just one
day—and then the police came and took him.” (Tr., p. 341, Ls. 19-25.)
Following the presentation of evidence the jury presented two questions to
the court, asking “Does a verdict on a count have to be unanimous? … or how
do we mark it if we are dead locked?” (Confidential Ex., p. 9; see Tr., p. 537,
L. 9 – p. 538, L. 22.) The jury did not ask any questions about Calvillo’s prior
incarceration or flight. (See Confidential Ex. p. 9; see Tr., p. 537, L. 9 – p. 540,
L. 18.)

2

Citations to “Confidential Ex.” refer to the PDF file of confidential exhibits on
appeal comprised of, among other things, the juror roll call sheet, the questions
submitted by the jury, and Calvillo’s presentence report. (See R., p. 310.)

4

The jury acquitted Calvillo of one count of lewd conduct but found him
guilty of the remaining count of sexual abuse and six counts of lewd conduct.

3

(Tr., p. 541, L. 23 – p. 543, L. 8.) The district court entered a judgment of
conviction and sentenced Calvillo to 30 years in prison with 15 years fixed. (R.,
pp. 261-65.)
Calvillo timely appealed. (R., pp. 278-82, 298-303.)

3

After the state rested one count of lewd conduct was dismissed pursuant to
Calvillo’s Rule 29 motion. (Tr., p. 424, L. 9 – p. 426, L. 17.)
5

ISSUE
Calvillo states the issue on appeal as:
Was Mr. Calvillo’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury violated
due to the district court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial after two
prospective jurors told the entire jury panel that Mr. Calvillo was
incarcerated and went missing?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Calvillo failed to show error in the district court’s denial of his motion for a
mistrial?

6

ARGUMENT
Calvillo Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Denial Of His Motion
For A Mistrial
A.

Introduction
Calvillo argues he was deprived of his due process right to trial by an

impartial jury. He contends that the settled standard of review should not apply
here, and rather, this Court should “clarify that the jury’s exposure to a
prospective juror’s prejudicial statement during voir dire is a structural defect.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) Calvillo argues that under such a standard the district
court erred by not granting a mistrial based on the jury’s exposure to comments
about his incarceration, and that he “went missing.”

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-

16.)
These arguments fail. The well-settled standard for a review of a denial
for a mistrial motion applies here, and under it, neither the incarceration
comment nor the “went missing” were grounds for a mistrial. The district court
therefore correctly denied Calvillo’s motion.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review for a denial of a motion for mistrial is well

established:
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the
mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether
the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented
reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record. Thus,
where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the
“abuse of discretion” standard is a misnomer. The standard, more
accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our focus is upon the
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continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the
mistrial motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial will be
disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted
reversible error.
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 68, 253 P.3d 727, 742 (2011) (quoting State v.
Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007)). This standard of review
has been applied in Idaho for decades and is “well-settled” law in the Idaho
Supreme Court’s view. Ellington, 151 Idaho at 68, 253 P.3d at 742; see also
Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285; State v. Sandoval-Tena,
138 Idaho 908, 912, 71 P.3d 1055, 1059 (2003); State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho
54, 57, 855 P.2d 891, 894 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 34,
752 P.2d 632, 636 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 94-95, 665
P.2d 1102, 1104-05 (Ct. App. 1983). Under this standard Calvillo bears the
burden of showing that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied
his motion for a mistrial. State v. Rodriquez, 106 Idaho 30, 33, 674 P.2d 1029,
1032 (Ct. App. 1983).

Thus, the appellate court reviews the full record to

determine if the event that triggered the motion for mistrial “represented
reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record.” Id.
Calvillo proposes upending this settled standard of review, arguing that
applying it here improperly “combines the reversible and harmless error
standard” due to the retrospective focus on the “context of the full record.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8.) Calvillo contends that juror exposure to an allegedly
prejudicial statement during voir dire is a structural defect necessitating a
reversible error review that does not look at the alleged error in the context of the
entire record. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)

8

But the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that controlling
precedent will not be overruled “unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has
proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to
vindicate the plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.”
State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting
Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)).
See also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992)
(“[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly wrong
or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise.”); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,
440-52, 825 P.2d 1081, 1096-1108 (1991) (McDevitt, J., specially concurring)
(“While it may seem that stare decisis is a rule of convenience, it is not. I believe
that this rule requires us to stand by our prior decisions unless there are
compelling and cogent reasons that necessitate a departure from our prior
rulings.”)
Calvillo fails to show that the settled standard of review is manifestly
wrong and fails to give compelling reasons for jettisoning it.

Calvillo

acknowledges the existing standard as set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court but
claims it conflicts with State v. Perry. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-8 (citing State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010)).) However, the Ellington Court
expressly reaffirmed the standard of review the year after Perry was decided.
Ellington, 151 Idaho at 68, 253 P.3d 727, 742. Had the Idaho Supreme Court
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wished to disrupt the established law in light of Perry it could have done so;
instead, it reaffirmed the standard and called it “well-settled.”4 Id.
Calvillo’s main objection is to the standard of review’s focus on the entire
context of the proceedings. He asks this Court to “clarify that the jury’s exposure
to a prospective juror’s prejudicial statement during voir dire is a structural
defect” and by definition incompatible with a review that looks to “if, and how, the
error ultimately impacted the trial.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8, 10.)
This argument fails first because the state is unaware of, nor does Calvillo
cite to, any controlling United States Supreme Court or Idaho authority holding
that mere exposure to potentially prejudicial statements during voir dire
constitutes structural error. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 7, n. 4 (citing to Perry, 150
Idaho at 222, 245 P.3d at 974).)
But beyond that, framing the issue this way misses the distinction
between exposure to allegedly prejudicial statements and the second-order
question of whether the jury was irreparably biased after hearing them.

As

explained more fully below, not all potentially prejudicial comments create an

4

Calvillo claims the Ellington Court “appeared to recognize” an inconsistency
between the settled standard and Perry but fails to support this argument.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.) Calvillo finds significance in the Ellington Court “explicitly
[declining] to evaluate whether the alleged constitutional error (jury bias) was
harmless or reversible.” (Appellant’s, brief, p. 8.) But of course, as Calvillo
himself quickly admits, the Court only declined to evaluate the effect of the
alleged error because it concluded there was no error in the first place—“the
defendant failed to show prospective jurors’ statements biased the empaneled
jurors.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 8 (citing Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 253 P.3d 961).) So
one cannot infer that the Ellington Court was saying anything about how to
evaluate an error, when it had already disposed of the matter by finding no error
existed.
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incurably biased jury. See State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498, 198 P.3d
128, 136 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 630-31, 97 P.3d 1014,
1019-20 (Ct. App. 2004). Courts accordingly possess a range of remedies short
of granting a mistrial—such as curative instructions—to address such
statements. See, e.g., Hill, 140 Idaho at 631, 97 P.3d at 1020. Logically, one
can only address the second question—was the jury irreparably biased—by
looking at what happened at trial after the prejudicial statement was made, and
after the district court ruled on the mistrial motion. By temporal necessity a
reviewing court must look at the entire trial to determine whether the prejudicial
statement nevertheless implicitly biased the jury or had a “devastating” impact on
the trial, or whether the district court’s curative actions were successful.5 See id.
The standard of review, structured as it is, reflects this.

5

By contrast, treating all prejudicial statements as structural defects would be
incapable of answering the relevant question: whether the district court correctly
determined that the trial could proceed with an impartial jury without the remedy
of a full-blown mistrial. If this Court defenestrated the established standard of
review and applied a structural defect standard in every prejudicial-comment
case, proving an a comment’s prejudice to the slightest degree would secure
reversal on appeal. And mistrials would likely be granted for every potentially
prejudicial statement; because why carry on with the proceedings if the reviewing
court would be unable to consider the rest of the trial? This unforgiving approach,
beyond being uneconomic and unrequired by controlling authority, would go in
stark contrast to the constitutional standard: due process does not require
perfect trials, just fair ones. See State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d
273, 285 (2007) (citing State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-28, 725 P.2d 128,
132-33 (1986)).
11

Because not every prejudicial statement creates an irreparably biased jury
the district court’s decision on a mistrial motion is necessarily forward-looking.
And to assess whether the district court erred, the reviewing court naturally looks
to the entire record following the ruling.

This standard of review is well

established over the decades, applies here, and Calvillo has failed to show that it
should be overruled.
C.

Calvillo Has Failed To Show The District Court’s Jury Instructions Were
Insufficient To Cure Any Potential Prejudice Caused By Statements
Regarding His Prior Incarceration
Trial by an impartial jury is a criminal defendant’s constitutional right. U.S.

Const. amends. V, VI, XIV; Idaho Const. art. 1, §§ 7, 13; Ellington, 151 Idaho at
69, 253 P.3d at 743. A fair trial, however, is “not necessarily a perfect trial.” See
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007) (citing State v.
Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-28, 725 P.2d 128, 132-33 (1986)). Consequently,
“[t]he admission of improper evidence does not automatically require the
declaration of a mistrial.” Grantham, 146 Idaho at 498, 198 P.3d at 136.
Jurors are “presumed to be impartial”:
[T]he Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair
cross section of the community is impartial, regardless of the mix of
individual viewpoints actually represented on the jury, so long as
the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn
duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular case.
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988) (quoting Lockhart v. McCree,
476 U.S. 162, 184 (1986); see also State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho at 69, 253 P.3d
at 743 (“The trial court does not need to find jurors that are entirely ignorant of
the facts and issues involved in the case. To hold that the mere existence of any
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preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is
sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror’s impartiality would be to
establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his
impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in
court.”). Thus, “[w]here improper testimony is inadvertently introduced into a trial
and the trial court promptly instructs the jury to disregard such evidence, it is
ordinarily presumed that the jury obeyed the court’s instruction entirely.” Hill,
140 Idaho at 631, 97 P.3d at 1020.
Defendants may challenge the presumption of juror impartiality for “‘actual
or implied’ bias.” State v. Lankford, 2017 WL 2838135, __ P.3d __ (Idaho, July
3, 2017) (quoting United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936)); State v.
Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 421, 348 P.3d 1, 36 (2014). Implied bias, as it seems
Calvillo contends lurked here, “conclusively presumes bias as a matter of law
based on the existence of a specific fact.”6 Lankford, 2017 WL 2838135 (citing
to Wood, 299 U.S. at 133); I.C. § 19-2018(2).

6

Calvillo has not stated on appeal whether he thinks the jurors were actually or
impliedly biased, but one presumes he claims the latter. Alternatively, Calvillo
has waived any claim that any jurors were actually biased as he did not contend
below that any jurors were actually biased. State v. Garcia–Rodriguez, 2017 WL
2569786, *3 (June 14, 2017) (“Issues not raised below will not be considered by
this court on appeal, and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the
case was presented to the lower court.”). He has also waived the issue
because, despite his trial counsel averring actually seeing specific jurors
exhibiting “what I believed to be, physical reactions”—such as heads jerking and
eyes widening in reaction to the allegedly prejudicial statements—counsel invited
any such error by never moving to strike any of those jurors for cause. (See
Confidential Ex. p. 9; see Tr., p. 36, Ls. 1 – p. 150, L. 18; p. 154, Ls. 5-14); see
State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 501, 660 P.2d 1336, 1344 (1983) (“Even though
apparently dissatisfied with the jury panel, appellant did not challenge any juror
for cause nor exercise all of her peremptory challenges. Having failed to exhaust
13

But the presumption that the jury “will follow an instruction to disregard
inadmissible evidence” can only be overcome by showing there is an
“‘overwhelming probability’ that the jury will be unable to follow the court’s
instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be
‘devastating’ to the defendant.” Hill, 140 Idaho at 631, 97 P.3d at 1020 (quoting
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766, n. 8 (1987)). In other words, Idaho courts ask
whether the allegedly improper evidence had a “continuing impact on the trial.”
State v. Laymon, 140 Idaho 768, 770, 101 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2004) (where
the court found defendant was not deprived of a fair trial because “there is no
evidence that the jury here did not follow the trial court’s instructions,” the
improper-comment making juror was removed, there was “no evidence that her
statements had but a passing, inconsequential effect on the remaining pool
members,” and there was “nothing in the record to show that the potential juror’s
views about the previous week’s aborted trial had a continuing impact” on the
trial).
Here, Calvillo has failed to meet his burden to show that the jurors did not
follow the court’s instructions to disregard juror statements. He likewise fails to
show that the comment that he was incarcerated had a devastating impact on
him or had any continuing impact on the trial. Before the incarceration comment
was made the jury was specifically instructed that:

the means available to her to exclude unacceptable jurors, appellant cannot now
claim error in the trial court denial of her motion to dismiss the entire jury
panel.”).
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Likewise, none of the statements, opinions, or beliefs expressed by
any of you prospective jurors are evidence in this case, and you
should not permit any such statements, opinions, or beliefs to
influence your decision if you are selected to be a juror in this case.
(Tr. p. 35, Ls. 10-15.) The jurors are presumed to have followed this instruction
to not let a single statement about Calvillo’s incarceration influence their
decision. The record likewise does not show that the single statement about
Calvillo’s incarceration had any effect whatsoever on the proceedings, let alone
devastating or continuing impact.

The juror who made the statement was

removed. (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 6-9.) The potential jurors made no other statements
about Calvillo being incarcerated

(see generally, Tr., pp. 37-150) and the

empaneled jurors did not ask any follow-up questions pertaining to the
incarceration (see Confidential Ex. p. 9; see Tr., p. 537, L. 9 – p. 540, L. 18).
The victim, just one of the state’s several witnesses, testified in detail regarding
Calvillo’s crimes. (Tr., pp. 170-424.) Lastly, Calvillo was acquitted of one of the
charges against him (Tr., p. 543, Ls. 1-4), which is completely inconsistent with a
theory that Calvillo did not receive a fair trial because the jury was infected with
bias against him. A review of the record shows that the statement had no effect
whatsoever on the trial, let alone a continuing, devastating impact.
Calvillo contends otherwise, arguing the disclosure of the fact he was
incarcerated was “inherently prejudicial.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 14.)

Calvillo

claims the statement “completely undermined” his presumption of innocence
because it invited harmful speculation, and because the jury would invariably
know he had been incarcerated for a previous offense, or was convicted of, or
“was a flight risk for,” this case. (Appellant’s brief, p. 14.)

15

This line of attack fails first because it gets the presumptions precisely
backward: the legal standard presumes the jurors were impartial, and presumes
they followed the instruction not to let the juror comments sway them, rather than
presuming that the comment invited harmful speculation and wonderment to the
point of bias. Hill, 140 Idaho at 631, 97 P.3d at 1020 (citing Greer, 483 U.S. at
766, n. 8). Moreover, Calvillo cannot explain why, if this comment so thoroughly
undermined his presumption of innocence, the jury nevertheless found him
innocent of one of the charges against him.

Here there is no support in the

record that the jurors engaged in any speculation, much less speculated to the
point where Calvillo did not receive a fair trial. This argument accordingly fails.
Calvillo analogizes to jail clothing cases, claiming that “[l]ike jail clothes or
shackles, the jury’s knowledge that a defendant was incarcerated raises serious
due process concerns.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 14 (citing State v. Miller, 131 Idaho
288, 293 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 301 (Ct. App. 2001)).)
But the jail clothing analogy is unhelpful here, as the Idaho Court of
Appeals has already resolved the question of whether isolated references to
incarceration are ipso facto improper. Similar to the comment here, in State v.
Hill, the prosecutor inquired of the detective, “What was the date you spoke to
[the defendant] in jail?” 140 Idaho at 630, 97 P.3d at 1019. The defendant
objected to the jail reference and moved for a mistrial. Id. The court sustained,
denied the motion, and issued a curative instruction. Id. at 630-31, 97 P.3d at
1019-20. On appeal, Hill, much like Calvillo, argued that the comment, “which
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disclosed that she had been in jail, was prejudicial and warranted a mistrial.” Id.
at 631, 97 P.3d at 1020.
The Court of Appeals disagreed.

Because, as the Court reiterated,

“[w]here improper testimony is inadvertently introduced into a trial and the trial
court promptly instructs the jury to disregard such evidence, it is ordinarily
presumed that the jury obeyed the court’s instruction entirely.” Id. Moreover, Hill
came nowhere near to showing that the remark was “devastating”:

Id.

The court here instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s
question, and the prosecutor’s disclosure to the jury that Hill had
been in jail could hardly be characterized as “devastating.” Given
that Hill was on trial for a criminal offense, even in the absence of
the prosecutor’s question, any reasonably knowledgeable juror
likely would have surmised that Hill had at some point been in jail.
Hill has not demonstrated that she was denied a fair trial.
Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in denying her
motion for a mistrial.
Here, the Hill holding applies to an even greater degree. Not only could

the jury have reasonably surmised that on-trial defendant Calvillo had been
incarcerated at some point, but in this case they heard that police came to
Calvillo’s house and “took him” away:
Q. What happened—after you told her what [Calvillo] was doing,
how much longer was [Calvillo] living in the house?
A. I think two more days, because the next day, my mom took me
to a clinic and—or maybe it might have been just one day—and
then the police came and took him.
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(Tr., p. 341, Ls. 19-25.)7 No reasonable juror would be surprised to learn that a
defendant who was visited and taken by the police—or in other words,
arrested—had also been incarcerated at some point.8 Given the record here and
the holding from Hill, Calvillo cannot show that the single comment regarding his
incarceration was consequential in the least, let alone “devastating,” as he must
do to show error.
Calvillo has failed to meet his burden to show that the jurors did not follow
the court’s instructions, or that the comment that he was incarcerated had a
devastating impact on him, or had any continuing impact on the trial.

He

therefore falls far short of showing that the district court erred by not granting a
mistrial as a remedy. Because the jury is presumed to have been impartial and
to have followed the district’s courts instructions to not let juror comments sway
them, Calvillo has failed to show the court erred in denying his motion for a
mistrial.
D.

Calvillo Has Failed To Show A Comment That He “Went Missing” Was
Prejudicial, Much Less That The District Court Erred In Denying His
Motion For A Mistrial Based On This Comment
Calvillo also claims that “it was improper for the jury to learn that

7

Calvillo did not object to this question nor did he move to strike the victim’s
answer. (See Tr., pp. 341-42.)

8

Nor would reasonable jurors would be fazed to learn that a defendant, whom
they heard warned his victim that if she “ever told, that he would go to jail,” in fact
ended up in jail. (Tr., p. 361, Ls. 15-18.)
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Mr. Calvillo ‘went missing’ sometime after 2008.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.) He
contends that this statement was also inherently prejudicial because, like
excluded evidence showing Calvillo fled his prior trial, it indicated he had a guilty
conscience. (Appellant’s brief, p. 15 (citing R., pp. 120-123).) Calvillo thinks that
“the jury was left to speculate” and concludes that “[u]ndoubtedly, questions and
inferences arose as to when exactly Mr. Calvillo went missing, where he went,
for how long, and why.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.) Calvillo argues that “[l]ike the
incarceration statement, this statement was inherently prejudicial and therefore
biased the jury against” him. (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.)
Here again, Calvillo has failed to meet his burden to show that the jurors
did not follow the court’s instructions or that the comment that he “went missing”
had a devastating, continuing impact on the trial. On this point Calvillo again
inverts the presumptions, speculating about what the jurors might have
speculated about, rather than showing record-based evidence that the comment
he “went missing” overcame the judge’s instructions or the jurors’ presumed
impartiality, or had a devastating continuing impact on the trial. (See Appellant’s
brief, p. 15.)

The record shows to the contrary that this comment, like the

incarceration comment, had no impact on the trial. (See supra, p. 14.)
Nor can Calvillo hang his hat on the jail-clothing cases, because unlike jail
clothing, “went missing” on its own has no inherent connection to criminality or
incarceration. People innocently go missing for all sorts of non-carceral reasons:
vacationing coworkers go missing from work, ill classmates go missing from
school, and famed aviators go missing over the ocean, to name just a few. And
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as the district court pointed out, Juror 70 did not couch the “went missing” event
in the context of this case. (Tr., p. 37, L. 10 – p. 38, L. 7; p. 155, Ls. 1-3.) It is
only with the full knowledge of Calvillo’s multi-year case history could one leap to
the conclusion that because Calvillo’s former coworker mentioned he went
missing at some point in time since 2008, that Calvillo must have been harboring
a guilty conscience and fleeing from authorities in connection with these very
9
charges. Calvillo concludes that the jury must have rampantly speculated about

his guilty-conscience but himself only speculates that they did. He fails to meet
his burden to show record-based evidence that the comment had a devastating
impact on the trial.
Calvillo argues that the two statements “combined have a prejudicial
effect,” particularly because the statements were made “almost immediately”

9

Calvillo tries to connect the “went missing” comments with the state’s prior
attempt to introduce evidence of his flight, but this attempt founders. Prior to trial
the state did not simply seek to introduce the isolated fact that Calvillo “went
missing” as evidence of his guilty conscience; it specifically sought to introduce
evidence that he fled to Mexico during the prior trial. (R., p. 93; see also Tr., p.
8.) Likewise, the district court did not rule that Calvillo’s disappearance,
examined in a vacuum, was prejudicial; it specifically held that the flight
evidence, and Calvillo’s explanations for it, could not be brought before the jury
without also informing them of his prior trial and prior conviction. (R., pp. 122-23
(“[I]f the circumstances of the defendant’s prior jury trial and the outcome of that
trial were before the new jury the prejudicial effect of the prior trial proceedings
would substantially outweigh the probative value of the flight evidence in the
State’s case in chief.”).) Contrary to Calvillo’s assertion, the statement that a
coworker knew Calvillo from 2008 until he “went missing” did not necessarily
place the flight during the same time as the alleged abuse. (See Appellant’s
brief, p. 15.) Nor does an out-of-context “went missing” statement come
anywhere near implying there had been a prior trial, much less a conviction. The
district court’s pre-trial ruling on the flight evidence therefore has no bearing on
the effect of simply hearing Calvillo “went missing” without the context of the prior
trial.
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after “[t]he entire jury panel was read the charging document of nine sex
offenses against a child.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 15.)

Calvillo thus claims “it

cannot be said that this chain of events did not prejudice the jury against
Mr. Calvillo.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.) This argument fails because the standard
of assessing the continuing impact of one claimed error on the trial does not
require this Court to combine all the alleged errors together. Moreover, even if
this Court were to deploy an aggregated chain-of-events theory, the first link in
the prejudicial chain could never be the statements of the charges against the
defendant.

Jurors need to be told of, and of course frequently revisit, the

charges a defendant stands accused of. No workable standard of prejudice
could include statements of the charges themselves as compounding factors for
a mistrial, lest every trial of a serious crime end before it begins.
Lastly, Calvillo finds fault in the district court’s actions by noting that
“[m]oreover, the district court provided no specific curative instruction for these
statements.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.) The state contends that the district court
correctly ruled that its prior instruction, given at the beginning of voir dire,
inoculated the jurors against the statements that were made and cured any
prejudice that could have arisen. (See Tr. p. 35, Ls. 10-15; p. 155, Ls. 3-19.)
To the extent Calvillo now wishes to claim another instruction should have been
subsequently given, he has waived that claim because he never presented it to
the district court below. Garcia–Rodriguez, 2017 WL 2569786, *3 (June 14,
2017) (“Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal,
and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to

21

the lower court.”). Calvillo never requested a follow-up curative instruction as
part of his mistrial motion nor did he identify the lack of an instruction as part of
his theory for relief below. (See Tr., p. 152, L. 6 – p. 154, L. 14.)
In fact, Calvillo lobbied for exactly the opposite when he warned against
the dangers of mentioning the comments again, and specifically sought a mistrial
because he claimed there was no way to “correct” the comments without
highlighting” them:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you, Judge. During the Court’s
examination of the jury panel, two jurors expressed some
knowledge of the case. Specifically, one juror, who ultimately was
excused, indicated that she had knowledge of Mr. Calvillo “while he
was incarcerated.” That was the quote.
A second juror, who I believe was excused, indicated that he had a
professional relationship with Mr. Calvillo and that he knew him
when he, quote, “went missing,” unquote. Of course, the Court did
not follow up with questions concerning that, nor did either counsel,
because I think it was fraught with disaster, but, at this point in
time, the two jurors have infected, if you will, the entire panel with
information related to Mr. Calvillo’s incarceration, the jailing of
Mr. Calvillo, and with information that in someway, somehow, he
went missing which, I believe, suggests that he ran from these
charges. That certainly would be a reasonable interpretation of
that. Every juror in the courtroom heard it. There is, I don’t believe,
any way to correct it without highlighting it.
Under those circumstances, it is my position that a mistrial should
be declared in this case.
(Tr., p. 152, L. 6 – p. 153, L. 6 (emphasis added).) Because Calvillo not only
failed to argue another instruction should be given, but made a case for not
giving one below, any error in not doing so was arguably invited by him (see
State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 239-240, 985 P.2d 117, 119-20 (1999)), and is
not preserved as an issue on appeal.
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In sum, Calvillo has failed to show that the “went missing” comment was
all prejudicial to him, much less that it had a devastating impact on the trial. With
respect to both comments, the district court correctly concluded that a mistrial
was not necessary.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Calvillo’s judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 1st day of August, 2017.
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